DevSecOps

Essentials

Will begin shortly •••



Andrew Krug andrewkrug@gmail.com

@andrewkrug

Head of Security Advocacy @ **Datadog**

Antisiphon Instructor for **Cloud Security**

AUDIENCE WARNING

This presentation is full of jargon

16 4



A movement that began in about 2007



Two Movements

The agile software movement

- Speedy Delivery
- Customer Focus
- Tight small feedback loops

The DevOps Movement

- Value automation
- Speed delivery
- Integrate continuous

"When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure."

OC





Security


Development


We've already seen this ...


Purple teaming is a lot of the same within the mico-chasm of security

- Blue teams and red teams working together
- Accelerating feedback
- Using empathy











4 Truths of DevSecOps




There is a massive benefit to development and security working together



Culture is more important than technology




The wrong technology is worse than no technology



You can't spell **DevSecOps** without **DevOps**

What's the biggest bang for the \$\$\$ and time?



Take a maturity approach

time.now()


time.now() + timedelta(months=6)


between now and python4

beginner

expert

Trying to do everything can be a bit overwhelming





Gartner

Targeting Vulns by Complexity / Class

Easy

- Missing TLS
- No security headers
- Calling dangerous fxns
- Missing security controls

Medium

- Standard
 - OWASP bugs
- XSS, SQLi
- XXE, SSRF

Hard

- Complex, multi-step bugs
- Business logic flaws
- Abuse

Increasing Vuln Complexity

This is what we're all still trying to do





This is what we're all still trying to do

We're doing at Cloud Scale

This is what we're all still trying to do

Trying to do it at Cloud Scale








Table Stakes


Asset Inventory

Vulnerability Management

 In production and pre-production

Continuous Scanning


- In code
- Cloud



Asset Inventory

Who you gonna call?


Modern Applications are Complex



Code


Keep owner info close to the source

Source code custody chains if possible



Cloud Tagging Data lakes

Owner Environment Service Inventory data should be an accelerator for triage and remediation



In code inventory metadata

Text

- $1 \mid version: 1$
- 2 organization: twilio
- 3 jira_id: <jira project id>
- 4 pagerduty_id: <pagerduty schedule id>

Can The Real Codeowners Please Stand Up? Code Provenance at Scale

https://bit.ly/3J1cPG6

Cloud Inventory

Powered by tags

Stored in a data-lake

Searchable outside of your production account

Cloud Inventory

Powered by tags

Stored in a data-lake

Searchable outside of your production account

Cloud Inventory | Why non-production?

Create role		1 2 3 4
Review		
Provide the required information below and review	his role before you create it.	
An error occurred Your request has a problem. Please see Rate exceeded	the following details.	×
Role name*	test-role Use alphanumeric and '+=,.@' characters. Maximum 64 characters.	
Role description	Allows EC2 instances to call AWS services on your behalf.	•
	Maximum 1000 characters. Use alphanumeric and '+=,.@' characters.	
Trusted entities	AWS service: ec2.amazonaws.com	
* Required	Cancel	Previous Create role

Searchable outside of your production account

Q

Inventory systems can DoS Production

Open Source Inventory Solutions


- Purpose built for security inquiry
- Uses relationships to map relative risk





What is Cartography?

Cartography is a Python tool that consolidates infrastructure assets and the relationships between them in an intuitive graph view powered by a Neo4j database.



This is one area where a commercial option could be better / more reliable

What is the best use of your AppSec team's limited time?

Vulnerability Management

Pre-Prod and In Prod

Remember the good old days?

Scheduled task:

yum update -y

apt-get update && apt-get upgrade -y

wuauclt.exe /updatenow shutdown -r -t 0



Vulnerability Management

Into the great beyond

Vulnerabilities can be:

- Third party dependencies
- Indirect third party dependencies
- Engineering vulnerability (your code)
- OS vulnerability
- Cloud provider vulnerability
- Orchestrator vulnerability



Vulnerability Management

Into the great beyond

Vulnerabilities can be:

- Third party dependencies
- Indirect third party dependencies
- Engineering vulnerability (your code)
- OS vulnerability
- Cloud provider vulnerability
- Orchestrator vulnerability




Dependency Resolution

SBOM saves the day?

Executive order 14028 calls for all software vendors to the US government to list the components that they used to create their products with software bill of materials (SBOM) documentation by **September 2023.**

Interest is growing



Generating SBOM is easy

py382 🕽 syft clashapp/qa-page | head

https://github.com/anchore/syft

Knowing what to do with it is a challenge

\equiv kubernetes-source.spdx \times

Users > andrew.krug > Downloads > ≡ kubernetes-source.spdx

- 1 SPDXVersion: SPDX-2.2
- 2 DataLicense: CC0-1.0
- 3 SPDXID: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT
- 4 DocumentName: kubernetes-v1.21.3
- 5 DocumentNamespace: https://k8s.io/sbom/source/v1.21.3
- 6 Creator: Tool: k8s.io/release/pkg/spdx
- 7 Created: 2021-07-15T21:51:12Z
- 8
- 9
- ##### Package: kubernetes
- 11
- 2 PackageName: kubernetes
- 13 SPDXID: SPDXRef-Package-kubernetes
- 14 PackageDownloadLocation: NONE
- 15 FilesAnalyzed: true
- 16 PackageVerificationCode: 594452b21f75ca3d685f7590e329e3b7001bc259
- 17 PackageLicenseConcluded: Apache-2.0
- 18 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: MIT
- 19 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: Apache-2.0
- 20 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: BSD-3-Clause
- 21 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: ISC
- 22 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: BSD-2-Clause
- 23 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: MPL-2.0
- 24 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: MPL-2.0-no-copyleft-exception
- 25 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: LGPL-3.0-only
- 26 PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: GPL-2.0-only

SPDX format

Some projects like Kubernetes make these available

SPDX => OSV to use free databases

Run the spdx-to-osv tool, taking the information from the SPDX SBOM and mapping it to OSV vulnerabilities

\$ java -jar ./target/spdx-to-osv-0.0.4-SNAPSHOT-jar-with-dependencies.jar -l k8s-1.21.3-source.spdx -O out-k8s.1.21.3.json

https://security.googleblog.com/2022/06/sbom-in-action-finding-vulnerabilities.html

https://ossf.github.io/osv-schema

https://github.com/spdx/spdx-to-osv

Issues with plain SBOM



Some can be quite large

 How do you triage an SBOM for a container image bigger than 1GB

High rate of false positive / low fidelity alerts

Enter SCA (Software Composition Analysis)

Vendors triage so you don't have to


Attributes of great SCA

 SBOM Informed but not SBOM driven

• Built in workflow and prioritization

• Groups findings to resolve in batch





Goal is always to stop bugs pre-production ...

Sometimes they make it there over time or bypass tooling

Continuous Scanning

Code and Cloud

SAST, DAST, and IAST Oh my!!!

SAST - runs against code to detect known bad patterns in code using signatures

DAST - spin up the app and test it while it's running

IAST - whitebox version of DAST with specific cases

Less Complex

More Complex

Please don't DIY this stuff

Static Analysis - Rolling Your Own

- Approach: Source code -> [Parser] -> AST
 - Lang-specific parser, ANTLR, (best) multi-lang parser semantic, Ο bblfsh

exec(

```
cmd // multi-line calls are OK
```

other_exec(cmd) // another function

// exec(arg) in a comment

console.log("exec(foo) in a string")

Credit: https://bit.ly/4aEtjzT

OSS Solutions | SAST

-zsh


.

(base) andrew.krug@COMP-X17X5QY2C6 railsgoat % semgrep --config=auto

て第1

DAST Testing

DAST is a **"Black-Box" testing**, can find security vulnerabilities and weaknesses in a running application by injecting malicious payloads to identify potential flaws that allow for attacks like SQL injections or cross-site scripting (XSS), etc.



DAST Testing

https://www.zaproxy.org/



DAST in a pipeline

[INF0] S [INF0] R [INF0] I	NF0] Running a quick scan for http://127.0.0.1/							
Alert	I	Risk	CWE ID	URL				
<pre>+====================================</pre>				http://127.0.0.1/index.php?foo=%22%3E				
[INF0] S	hutting down ZAP	daemon						

https://github.com/Grunny/zap-cli

IAST – Still emerging

IAST (interactive application security testing) is an application security testing method that tests the application while the app is run by an automated test, human tester, or any activity "interacting" with the application functionality.


IAST – OSS



CSPM Cloud Security Posture Management

Hunt down misconfigurations before they are exploited

Public buckets, open security groups etc



Two types of CSPM

Point and shoot

• Prowler OSS

https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler

ScoutSuite

https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite

Continuous Scanning

- AWS Config
- Point and shoots with cron
- Cloud Custodian
- Commercial offerings like Datadog CSM

Favorite OSS CSPM



Date: 2022-12-02 12:53:30

This report is being generated using credentials below:

AWS-CLI Profile: [dev] AWS Filter Region: [all] AWS Account: [1 6] UserId: [A Caller Identity ARN: [arn:aws:sts::106

Executing 84 checks, please wait...

Overview Results:

32.96% (442) Failed 67.04% (899) Passed

Account 106908755756 Scan Results (severity columns are for fails only):

Provider	Service	Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low
aws	ec2	FAIL (107)	0	67	23	17
aws	iam	FAIL (3)	2	0	1	0
aws	kms	PASS (3)	0	0	0	0
aws	s3	FAIL (322)	1	1	320	0
aws	ssm	PASS (2)	0	0	0	0
aws	vpc	FAIL (10)	0	0	10	0

* You only see here those services that contains resources.

Detailed results are in:

- CSV: /Users/user/Documents/prowler-repos/prowler/output/prowler-output-1

- JSON: /Users/user/Documents/prowler-repos/prowler/output/prowler-output-1


6-20221202125330.csv 6-20221202125330.json [verica.io]


The next generation of CSPM



More context for dynamic criticality

The next generation of CSPM





More context for dynamic criticality



Tool Sprawl

More tools providing findings and signals than ever

Triage Pain

Engineers don't know where to start


Blind Spots


Most engineers don't get metrics from security tooling

Silos


Communication and empathy still needs work







Githu<u>b</u>



Rules of the AppSec Pipeline

- 1. Tight feedback loops to teams
 - a. Slack
 - b. Pull request comments
 - c. Commercial Product
- 2. Guidance not gates by default
- 3. Gates when failure is not an option as defined by risk assessment
- 4. Emit metrics as every stage to define maturity



Good and bad metrics

Good:

Number of vulns by criticality

Time to resolve vulns

Ignored vulns



Good and bad metrics

Less Good:

- Average age of bug
- Oldest vuln still in production
- Total number of findings






Add more tools as desired

Terraform Linter - https://github.com/terraform-linters/tflint

IAMSpy - https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/IAMSpy

CFNLint - https://github.com/aws-cloudformation/cfn-lint



If you liked this or you didn't

Brief Survey

https://forms.gle/mTtGgd2yaqu1XnKX7

Thank you