

#### **IP**PROACTIVE

### Whoami.exe



10+ Years of Incident Response, Digital Forensics and Threat Intelligence



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Digital Forensics and Incident Response, 3rd Edition



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# dir /ad

- WMI Overview
- Why discuss WMI abuse?
- A Brief History of WMI Abuse
- Leveraging WMI
- Demo
  - Emulating WMI Abuse
    - Local use
    - Remote use
    - Event Consumer



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### **WMI Overview**

#### WMI: Windows Management Instrumentation

- Microsoft's Common Information Model implementation
- Windows OS infrastructure for data management and operations
- Automates administrative tasks and remote system management
- Great deal of functionality and capability
- **Wmic.exe** is the Command-Line utility that allows for interaction with WMI <sup>[1]</sup>

# Why discuss WMI Abuse?

- Used by threat actors for Execution, Persistence and Lateral Movement
- Consistently shows up in threat intel reports: M-Trends, Threat Detection Report <sup>[2]</sup>
- Tied to other more common tools: CMD & PowerShell
- WMI Abuse is baked into many post exploitation frameworks





# A short history of WMI Abuse

- Stuxnet: Propagation through network shares <sup>[3]</sup>
- APT33: Persistence using suspicious Event Subscriptions [4]
- FireEye FLARE Team white paper on WMI Forensics <sup>[5]</sup>
- BlackEnergy2: WMI for host reconnaissance <sup>[6]</sup>
- Scattered Spider: Lateral movement [7]





### How do threat actors use WMI

- WMI Abuse can run through a variety of Tactics and Techniques:
  - Executing malicious code or scripts on local and remote systems
  - Reconnaissance on compromised system such as identifying processes or accounts
  - Discovery of network systems
  - Persistence through Event Consumers
  - Delete Volume Shadow Copies as part of ransomware attack

# **Leveraging WMI**

- WMI Modules exist in several common post-exploitation tools
  - Cobalt Strike
  - PowerShell Empire
  - Mimikatz
  - Metasploit
  - Impacket lots of Impacket
- WMI can be leveraged with PowerShell or Command-Line







### Investigating WMI Abuse

- Make investigating WMI abuse part of the overall triage process:
  - Think WMI use when looking at CMD and PowerShell execution
- Network Connections:
  - TCP 135, http 5985, & https 5986
- Windows Event Logs:
  - Windows Security Event ID 4688 Process Creation (sometimes)
  - Windows Sysmon Event ID 1 Process Creation
  - Windows Sysmon Event ID 19, 21, 22 Event Consumer Activity
  - Windows WMI-Operational Logs
  - Windows PowerShell Operational Logs
- OBJECTS.Data located in \Windows\System32\wbem\Repository<sup>[8]</sup>

### WMI Remote Execution



## WMI Event Subscription

- **Event Filter**: The condition that triggers the script/executable. Can be on uptime, user-logon, file creation.
- **Event Consumer**: Executable or script that is trigged to run. PowerShell or executable.
- **Binding**: This ties the Event Filter and Consumer together



### WMI Event Subscription

- Extract and analyze the Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational logs.
- Search for Event ID 5861. Look for:
  - Executables: .exe, .dll
  - Scripts: .vbs, .ps1
  - ActiveXObjects
  - Script Text



### Sample WMI Abuse

- T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation
  - Discovery
    - System reconnaissance: identify running processes
  - Lateral Movement Technique
    - Remote Command Execution
- T1546.003: Event Triggered Execution WMI Event Subscription
  - Privilege Escalation & Persistence
    - Using the Event Subscription



### T1047: Windows Management Instrumentation

• Recon what processes are on a system

Invoke-AtomicTest T1047 -TestNumbers 2

• Recon what remote service is running on a system

Invoke-AtomicTest T1047 -TestNumbers 4

• Execute remote executable



Invoke-AtomicTest T1047 -TestNumbers 6



### T1546.003: Event Triggered Execution – WMI Event Subscription

• Maintain persistence using PowerShell



• Maintain persistence with MOFComp.exe to load Managed Object File (MOF)





### WMI Investigation Workflow



### **Velociraptor Overview**



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqEjxZph96c



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### Sources

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# Thank You

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